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DISARMAMENT

Atoms into Plowshares?

William R. Frye

NUMBER 113 **THIRTY-FIVE CENTS**

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HEADLINE SERIES

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For the first time since the guns were silenced at the end of World War II the possibility of disarmament seems to be something more than a frustrating mirage. The universal fear of the consequences of nuclear warfare, the restoration of a world balance of power, and the overwhelming desire of peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain for a modicum of peace and well-being have created a situation favorable to disarmament negotiations. This book presents a searching analysis of both the problems and the solutions now under consideration.

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NUMBER 113

SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1955

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The subject of this HEADLINE SERIES, "Disarmament," was chosen by a distinguished panel (names on request) as one of the ten most important foreign policy issues now facing the United States. Consult the FPA for information on programs about this and other "Annual Issues."

HEADLINE SERIES, No. 113, September 20, 1955, published bimonthly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N. Y. JOHN W. NASON, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, HEADLINE SERIES Editor; FELICE NOVICH, Assistant Editor. Subscription rates $2.00 for 6 issues. Single copies, 35¢. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER AUGUST 19, 1943, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.
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Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 55-11541

Disarmament — Atoms into Plowshares?

by William R. Frye

ACCORDING TO MEDIEVAL LEGEND, THE KNIGHTS OF King Arthur's Round Table repeatedly set out from Camelot in search of the Holy Grail, meeting many misadventures and failing in their quest because they were not sufficiently pure in heart. Only Galahad, Percivale and Bors proved worthy of the quest—and ultimately, even for them, the vision vanished from sight.

In modern times, disarmament—the reduction, control or elimination of weapons of war—has been the statesman's Holy Grail. Men have sought this goal for centuries, sometimes approaching it, occasionally even achieving it on a limited scale, only to have it vanish or prove disappointing. Yet the search goes on.

Idealist v. Cynic

Motives have varied. Some men have wished to cast off the heavy load of arms expenditure. Others have sought to make war less inhumane by restricting the type of weapons used. Still others have sought the ultimate goal—the elimination of war itself by removing the weapons with which it is fought.

Cynics have scorned the search as wholly unrealistic, as a veritable quest for a vision, for a "cup hanging in the sky like a burning jewel." So long as wars are fought, men must arm for them, the realists argue. A man or a nation, they say, will use any weapon he has, or can obtain, if survival is at stake—and an aggressor will use any weapon he thinks will achieve his end. He may be deterred by fear of reprisal, but not by anything less.

Do Arms Make War — or Vice Versa?

Do armaments lead to war, or does the danger of war impel men to arm? Which comes first and produces the other, arms reduction or the easing of international tensions? This argument has raged for generations, without any prospect of settlement. All that is agreed is that human nature itself is the basic source of difficulty. "From whence come wars and fightings among you?" asked the prophet James nearly 2,000 years ago. "Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain; ye fight and war. . . ." As Dr. Charles Malik, the brilliant Lebanese diplomat, has pointed out, if man did not have bombs, he would fight with guns; if he did not have guns, he would fight with rocks; if he did not have rocks, he would fight with fists. Every man's weapons are to him defensive; it is the enemy's that threaten the peace. In the last analysis the only complete solution to disarmament, it is agreed, will be that millennial exaltation of thought and action described figuratively by Isaiah as a "mountain of the Lord" in which all nations, governed by divine law, will "beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks," never to "learn war any more."

Is There a Solution?

Short of a transformation of human nature to be accomplished by theology—short of that purification of motive typified by a Galahad—is there no solution to the problem of armaments? This

The age-old search

is the question which statesmen and diplomats have been asking for centuries.

They are asking it with greater urgency than ever today. In the context of the atomic age some form of arms regulation is no longer merely a desired goal; it is well-nigh a necessity. Weapons are now very close to absolute. The fall-out from a 10-megaton bomb of the Bikini type could contaminate an area as large as 100,000 square miles so seriously as to make it uninhabitable for

many days. And there may be no limit to the potential size of these bombs.

"There are plenty of problems in the world, many of them interconnected," Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has said. "But there is no problem which compares with this central, universal problem of saving the human race from extinction."

Urgency does not necessarily make a problem any easier of solution. It sometimes stimulates wishful thinking. Men want a solution so badly that they grasp at straws, at will-o'-the-wisps. They fall prey to unprincipled propagandists. They are easily convinced that half a solution is better than none, when, in point of fact, half a solution may be far more dangerous than none.

But urgency can and often does stimulate efforts to find a truly satisfactory solution. In 1955 at London, at Geneva, at United Nations headquarters in New York, and elsewhere efforts have been redoubled. New ideas have been put forward. For the first time, there seems to be a wish on all sides to make progress, a willingness to negotiate realistically.

As a result, the East-West gap on disarmament and nuclear energy control has been narrowed. Can it now be closed?

Do We Want to Scrap A-Bomb?

DISARMAMENT IN THE ATOMIC AGE IS FEASIBLE ONLY if three fundamental questions can all be answered in the affirmative.

They are these:

1. Is the elimination of nuclear weapons in the interest of both sides in the great ideological conflict of our time? Specifically, speaking of Americans, is it—on balance—in the interest of the United States?

2. Is wholly effective, indeed foolproof, atomic control a technical possibility in today's world? If not, would some approximation be safe enough?

3. Is the invasion of national sovereignty which would be necessary for any worthwhile control system a political possibility—either in the Soviet Union or in the United States?

Nearly all students of the problem now agree that not one of these questions can be answered affirmatively with complete confidence.

There are many in the United States who doubt that funda-

mental American interest would be served by nuclear weapon control. Their argument—the case against total nuclear disarmament—is based on two principal premises.

Do A-Bombs Outlaw War?

The first such premise is that nuclear weapons make war impossible. Throughout history, men have been making this statement about each new weapon: gunpowder was to have made war unthinkable, then poisonous gas, and the airplane, and even the submarine. But this time, it is argued, the ultimate weapon has in fact been devised; war would mean literal extinction. So long as both sides know they face total destruction, the argument goes, there will be no war.

A policy of atomic deterrents has, in fact, been the basis of American strategic thinking since 1945. The bomb has been regarded as the principal curb on Soviet aggression. When, in 1949, the Soviets, too, obtained the bomb, we too were deterred; but—except for a fringe of preventive-war advocates—we had no desire to commit aggression. So the fundamental strategic facts were not altered.

General Douglas MacArthur is said to have been asked by two quarreling junior officers for permission to hold a duel. "Yes," he is said to have replied, "on these conditions. You will each load and cock your pistols. You will stand at arm's length, each man pointing his pistol at the other's heart. When I say 'Fire!' you may have your duel."

Twin Brothers: Survival and Annihilation

Sir Winston Churchill, with his unparalleled knack for coining quotable phrases, has put into one sentence the thesis that nuclear weapons serve to prevent war. Pointing out that both East and West will soon reach the "saturation point"—the point at which each can totally destroy the other—he said in one of his final speeches as British prime minister:



U.S. B-52



RUSSIA'S BISON

They can carry H-bombs more than 5,000 miles

"It may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage . . . where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

If nuclear weapons do in fact serve to keep the peace, the United States would be prudent to think twice before scrapping them, it is argued.

There is, of course, a flaw in this reasoning. Sir Winston himself recognized it. "I must make one admission," he said, "and any admission is formidable. The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found

himself in his final dugout." So long as nuclear weapons exist, this danger must be present. The prospect of indefinite safety through terror can hardly appeal to mankind.

Is There Safety from Attack?

A second fundamental objection to nuclear disarmament is the now recognized fact that no system of nuclear control, however far-reaching and theoretically perfect, could really afford 100 percent safety against surprise attack. A nation with the know-how to operate a power reactor might, if it were determined to commit aggression, secretly divert enough fissionable material of weapon grade to make the necessary bombs. Or it could use material or bombs which it had hidden away before the control system was instituted. In either case, no inspectorate, however uninhibited, could be 100 percent certain to discover the crime. Nor, if it did discover it, would it necessarily be able to do anything effective about it, however great its theoretical "enforcement" power. It could sound a warning, and prospective victims could look to their defenses; but would they have time enough to prepare?

Good Faith Essential

Thus any system of nuclear weapon control would have to depend to some extent, as President Eisenhower said July 6, 1955, on the good faith of the participating countries. Would the United States wish to depend for its safety on such a system? Knowing Marxist ideology and remembering past Soviet practice, what assurance do we have that we would not scrap our nuclear weapons, only to be confronted by a threat of atomic attack? The threat alone might be enough to terrorize a victim state into submission; certainly a responsible government, forced to choose between political capitulation and nuclear disaster, would face a terrible dilemma. As Churchill said:

"A quantity of plutonium—probably less than would fill this

box on the table [the dispatch box in the House of Commons] and quite a safe thing to store—would suffice to produce weapons which would give indisputable world domination to any great power which was the only one to have it."

If the United States ever were to scrap its bombs and suddenly find that an enemy had a stockpile, we could—and obviously would—rush to rebuild ours. It would not take long. With the necessary "hardware"—that is, bomb casings, etc.—nearby to breeder reactors which turn out weapon-grade fissionable material as a normal by-product of peaceful use, it might take only a matter of days. Disarmament experts in Washington and elsewhere have worked out an alarm system which, if accepted in full by the Soviet Union, could almost certainly provide at least 24 hours warning. But that might not be enough, and in an era of intercontinental guided missiles, with launching platforms which might be hidden, the problem is multiplied manyfold. It probably will never be possible to eliminate the danger entirely. Many people believe we would all sleep more soundly at night if we kept at least some of our stockpile intact.

Arms and Balance of Power

In addition to these two principal arguments against disarmament—the theory that nuclear weapons prevent war, and the knowledge that disarmament cannot be made wholly safe—there is a third thesis which has had much currency in past years. It is this: that nuclear disarmament would upset the world balance of power to the disadvantage of the United States. Since the principal source of American power is in the atomic realm, it has been argued, the elimination of nuclear weapons would weaken us more than it would the Soviet Union.

In point of fact, this thesis is no longer valid. It would take only a limited number of hydrogen bombs to knock the United States squarely into the Stone Age; and once the Soviet Union has that number and the means to deliver them—if it has not

already reached that point—American superiority loses its meaning. Moreover, in May 1955, for the first time, the Kremlin agreed to cut its land force down to a point that is roughly on a level with ours, and, what is equally important, to begin the process and carry it three-quarters of the way to completion before nuclear weapons are prohibited. The Soviet Union, in short, is now willing to negotiate on the basis we always have set forth—namely, a balanced and phased program of arms reduction. Previously the Kremlin had insisted on proportionate cuts in conventional armaments—a one-third cut across the board by all parties—which, of course, would have perpetuated its superiority in that field.

Do we want to scrap our nuclear weapons? Would such a step be in the interest of the United States?

In the last analysis the answer probably boils down to this: How much safety would disarmament provide?

Would it be possible to reduce the risk to a point where we would feel safer without atom bombs than with them? Is a relatively safe plan of atomic control feasible today?

This is the second of the three principal questions originally posed. Is disarmament technically feasible in today's world?

Can There Be Effective Controls?

THE UNITED STATES SET OUT TO DEVISE A FOOLPROOF control plan for atomic energy almost immediately after Hiroshima. We felt a moral obligation to try to restrain the genie which our scientists, together with those of Britain and Canada, had unleashed. We could hardly fail at least to offer such restraint, despite the temporary damage it would do to our military posture; had we not been impelled to do so by our own conscience, and by fears for the future, we would have been constrained by world public opinion.

As early as November 15, 1945 the United States, Britain and Canada proposed establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission whose task it would be to find ways of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." In preparation for its expected labors, a State Department committee under Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary, was set up, and a Board of Consultants under David E. Lilienthal was appointed. These groups, embracing many of the most knowledgeable atomic scientists, businessmen and public figures in the country, wrestled with the problem of controlling atomic energy. They devised a plan which, when presented to the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946 with certain modifications, came to be known as the Baruch plan. Bernard M. Baruch was chief United States delegate to the AEC.

The Baruch plan was an elaborate and imaginative effort to bring politics and international relations abreast of the tremendous revolution which had taken place in the scientific realm. It started with the conviction—never since challenged—that inspection alone, however uninhibited, could not provide complete assurance against secret weaponeering. "There is no prospect of security against atomic warfare," it was declared, "in a system of international agreements . . . which relies [only] on inspection and similar police-like methods."

World Monopoly of Atomic Energy

The American planners therefore proposed, and the Baruch plan provided for, an international monopoly of atomic energy. An International Atomic Development Authority was proposed which would manage and operate all plants producing atomic materials in "dangerous quantities"; it would license and supervise all other plants. The authority would itself own all atomic raw materials, from mine to factory, and all nuclear fuel produced in dangerous quantities. Violations of a treaty embodying these provisions could be punished without any veto to stand in the way. When the control program had been put into "effective operation," the manufacture of bombs would stop, stockpiles would be converted to peaceful use, and all secrets would be shared with the authority. The authority would decide when the moment of "effective operation" had arrived.

This plan was as nearly foolproof as the ingenuity of man could devise at the time. If an international organ owned all nuclear fuel and all sources of it, could it not guarantee its proper allocation? If the international organ operated the reactors which employed the fuel, could not secret diversion to weapons be prevented? Perhaps; but even the authors of the Baruch plan were not wholly sure. What would prevent a nation bent on aggression from seizing a plant or bribing the local manager or stealing minute quantities of weapon-grade nuclear fuel from time to

time over a period of years until a dangerous cache had been accumulated?

Danger of Illegal Seizure

Mr. Baruch recognized at least one of these perils—illegal seizure—in his initial presentation to the AEC. "Once the basic information is generally known," he said, "and the authority has established producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent nation to produce a bomb in 12 months, and if preceded by secret preparation and necessary facilities, perhaps even in a much shorter time." The Baruch plan provided for "immediate, swift and sure punishment" for violations; but it was never clear how a great power such as the Soviet Union could be "punished" short of world war, nor was it clear whether the nations doing the "punishing" would be able to win the race for atomic weapons in such an event.

Whether the Baruch plan would have been a foolproof scheme in 1946 is, of course, an academic question. The Soviet Union totally rejected it. And the real question is not whether foolproof control was possible in 1946, but whether it is possible today. There is now virtually universal agreement that 100 percent foolproof control is not possible and would not be possible even if by some miracle the Soviet Union suddenly were to embrace the Baruch plan *in toto*.

The Soviet Union has known the basic facts about nuclear fission at least since 1947 and probably longer. During each of the years which have followed, the Russians could have hidden away a formidable amount of bomb material or of bombs themselves. An international inspectorate, using intricate accounting procedures, could trace down a large proportion of past production but could not be sure it had found it all. To mention only one problem, records could be falsified. It would be a difficult thing to do; and if a treaty made it illegal, it would be dangerous,

because of the multiplicity of cross-checks available to inspectors. But it would be possible. And there are other problems. The weight of nuclear fuel varies a certain amount with the humidity. Thus it would be necessary to know not merely the capacity of a reactor and its operating procedures, but on what day and at what hour every gram of fuel was produced, if the inspectors were to be 100 percent sure none had been diverted. After a passage of years, this obviously is impossible.

Concealment Relatively Easy

A cache of nuclear weapon material could be hidden away without any great difficulty. Radiation can be blanketed by ordinary water; thus, bombs or bomb ingredients could be hidden under lakes or ponds. And there are other methods of shielding radiation. A bomb casing is itself a good shield.

It would be necessary to deliver weapons to a target; but this, too, need not be a difficult problem. Long-range commercial aircraft could be converted for the task quite quickly, and refueling techniques have greatly extended the range of small-size planes. This problem could perhaps be met by international operation of civilian airlines, as Thomas K. Finletter and others have suggested; but bombs could be delivered by submarine or merchant ship or even in a traveler's brief case. The casings can be as small as four or five inches in length. Moreover, if the age of intercontinental guided missiles has arrived, as it apparently has, the problem has been complicated still further. It would not be easy to hide launching platforms, but it presumably would be posssible—in caves, natural or man-made, or wholly underground. There are those in the Pentagon who think it is not too fantastic to picture a group of pneumatically operated platforms hidden in a well-camouflaged Siberian steppe, capable of being lowered out of sight or raised into firing position on short notice. An inspectorate with the right to conduct aerial reconnaissance—such as was proposed by President Eisenhower

at the Geneva conference July 21, 1955—probably would be able to discover such an installation, but there would always be the haunting possibility of successful evasion.

What Eisenhower Thinks

President Eisenhower was asked about this problem at his press conference on July 6, 1955. He said guided missiles are "not made in a very small factory," and when one is made, "I think its character can be determined instantly. . . . I don't believe that you could take an extensive guided missile program and conceal it from any decent or effective system of inspection." By inference, he appeared to be confident that the Soviet Union has not already produced and hidden away either the missiles or the launching platforms or both. But he left open the possibility that a small (as distinct from an "extensive") guided missile program could be concealed.

The whole problem of atomic control was summarized in a further exchange of question and answer:

Q.—"Mr. President, would I be correct in understanding, then, from what you have said so far on this whole disarmament thing and on inspection, [that] what you come down to is the question of good faith, that you have to believe that you have arrived at a point where you can trust those [who oppose you], because it is impossible to get adequate inspection and control?"

The President answered:

A.—"This is just as true as you are standing there. In the long run, the kind of peace for which we are seeking, the kind of peace that will allow people to be really tranquil and confident in their daily pursuits, will be achieved only when nations have achieved that mutual trust of which you speak.

"Now, what we are up against now is an interim phase. We are trying to make a step toward that, and to reduce burdens at the same time. So I should say that, knowing none of us has that trust in the opposite side, we must search diligently for some

means to lessen this danger and proceed a little way toward the creation of that trust which must, in the long run, be the foundation of any real peace."

Kremlin View, May 10, 1955

The Soviet Union has taken a public position which, interestingly enough, is not dissimilar. In its note of May 10, 1955, presented to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee in London, the Kremlin said:

"Inasmuch as the necessary trust between states is now lacking, a situation may arise in which the adoption of a decision of international control will actually be reduced to a mere formality failing to achieve the purpose. . . .

"It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be utilized for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials, and moreover in ever greater quantities.

"This means that states having enterprises for the production of atomic energy are able, in violation of their respective agreements, to accumulate big quantities of explosive material for the production of atomic weapons.

"The danger of such a situation becomes still more understandable if account is taken of the fact that, given the corresponding quantities of explosive atomic materials, the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs, as such, is a matter fully feasible technically and can be organized on a wide scale.

Airtight Control Held Impossible

"*Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for circumventing this control and organizing the secret manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement of international control* [author's italics].

"Under such a situation, the security of the states signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed insofar as

the possibility would be open for the potential aggressor to stockpile atomic and hydrogen weapons for sudden atomic attack on peace-loving states."

Aside from certain propagandistic phrases, this passage in the May 10 note is regarded in Washington as a remarkably candid and accurate description of the state of affairs. There are, indeed, "possibilities beyond the reach of international control for circumventing this control and organizing the secret manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons." Control of biological weapons would be even more difficult. It does not necessarily follow that the effort at control is useless; but recognition of the challenge and of the impossibility of foolproof control is certainly a useful starting point.

If airtight control is not possible, what approximation *is* available? How far can the margin of risk be reduced? Can the danger of "sudden atomic attack"—of "frightful surprise," as President Eisenhower has called it—be eliminated?

It is this aspect of the problem which has been preoccupying Washington for some time. Presidential Assistant Harold E. Stassen and other disarmament experts have decided that what is needed, at rock bottom, is an early warning system, a brightly lighted plate-glass window which a would-be aggressor would have to break with a resounding crash when he took the first step toward nuclear aggression.

In all probability this is the most that could have been obtained, even from a plan as nearly airtight as the Baruch plan was thought to be at the outset.

Burglar-Alarm System

The principal method of obtaining advance warning would be to place the strategic air forces of East and West under careful surveillance. The location and activities of each plane could be known at all times. The men doing the watching could report at regular intervals; any major interruption in their reports—caused,

Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Air Strength*

* Based on New York Times estimate (May 29, 1955). Factors other than numbers affect relative air strength, such as quality of planes, location and number of bases, supply networks, etc.

for example, by a total blackout of communications or a seizure of the inspecting personnel—would immediately alert a potential victim. There would be problems to solve, of course. What to do in case of a minor interruption—two or three inspectors, for example, failing to report? Would it be a *casus belli,* or an accident? How would the inspectors be certain they could distinguish between training flights or feints ("spoofs") and the real thing? The consequences of a mistake could be very far-reaching.

Another method of obtaining advance warning of an enemy attack would be to watch his communications system. Any major increase in the volume of traffic in code would be suspicious. Inspectors also could keep careful watch of electric-power consumption. Nuclear reactors require a large amount of electricity; it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to hide both a generating plant of the necessary size and a clandestine reactor. Still other means would be scrutiny of national defense budgets, as both the

Soviet Union and France have proposed; a study of steel and aluminum production, of jet-engine output, of the manufacture of electronics equipment, and other similar telltale items. Stockpiles of fissionable material could be watched; the rate of consumption for peaceful purposes could be traced; the personnel with know-how to make weapons could be put under surveillance; tests of some kinds of nuclear weapons—missiles, for example—could be halted or strictly supervised.

President Eisenhower's dramatic proposal at the Geneva "summit" conference—that the United States and the U.S.S.R. exchange "blueprints" of their military establishments and verify them by aerial reconnaissance—was a step in the direction of preventing surprise attack. Modern aerial photography is a very advanced science; there is little that can be concealed from the camera eye. Photo-reconnaissance planes can operate successfully at extremely high altitudes; if they were permitted free run of a country at heights of only a few thousand feet, their pictures of the earth's surface would produce minute detail. Anything not camouflaged with the utmost care would arouse the suspicion of the highly trained specialists who interpret such photos.

The physical problem involved in studying the literally millions of photographs which would be taken of a country the size of the Soviet Union would be tremendous. How to single out from this mass the pictures requiring detailed scrutiny? The personnel with the training to do that kind of thing is limited. But once this practical problem were solved, there would be almost nothing about a country's defenses that would escape notice. Could aerial photography uncover launching platforms for the dreaded IBM (intercontinental ballistics missile)? Washington officials in a position to know say yes; it could uncover a series of platforms for sure, although it conceivably might miss one or two isolated ones. When and if cameras based on the X-ray principle are perfected, a great deal which is below the surface will be revealed—

and this could be a key to unlock the whole problem of weapon control.

What would a nation do if it found something suspicious on the prints? It naturally would want to investigate on the spot, or have someone it trusted do so. Serious violations, when verified, could be reported to key UN organs and to potential victim states. For lesser violations, there could be an elaborate judicial system of international investigation, trial and appeal which could be called into action. The United Nations has or could easily create ample machinery for such a system. Refusal to submit to investigation and legal arraignment would itself give other states moral justification for countermeasures. This is the direction in which official Washington has been moving.

The Soviet Union, too, has apparently been thinking in terms of a "burglar-alarm" system, although of quite a different type. Its May 10 note came forward with a proposal which the United States is prepared to accept under certain conditions. The U.S.S.R. proposed that "with the object of preventing sudden attack by one state on another state, the international control agency shall set up on the territories of all the respective states, along reciprocal lines, control posts in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes. The task of these posts shall be to watch that there should be no dangerous concentrations of ground forces or of air and naval forces."

Danger Signs

The assumption on which this proposal is based is that war preparation "is inescapably associated with the need to concentrate at definite points large military formations with big quantities of conventional armaments: aircraft, guns, tanks, naval vessels and so forth." Up to a point, this assumption is accepted in Washington as obviously valid. A nation preparing for major aggression would normally mobilize its infantry, parachute troops, and marines to follow up a nuclear attack and occupy the enemy territory. If the operation involved crossing water, troop ships (or

planes) would be readied. The tempo of heavy industry would be stepped up. Transport within the home territory would be organized. Mobilization for war is a far-reaching undertaking. It could indeed be detected by control posts of the type suggested, if they were free to observe without restriction and to go whenever and wherever they felt necessary (as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, a possible prototype, is not).

It remains to be seen just how much authority the Soviets are willing to grant these control posts. The ones to be stationed at airfields, for example, could—if permitted—do all the United States has in mind in the direction of monitoring and checking the disposition of strategic air commands. East and West could be talking about much the same thing. On the other hand, if the authority of the control posts were closely restricted, they would not be of much use.

Malevolent Colossi?

At the very least, the proposed system of control posts would have to be combined with other early warning techniques. The best that could be devised would not be foolproof; and even this much control would require considerable sacrifice of national sovereignty as we have come to know it. The American people might not wish to put their trust in such a limited security arrangement, preferring instead to leave the "two atomic colossi," as President Eisenhower called them, "doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world."

This question—whether the kind of control system which is practical is also desirable—is a political matter. It raises the third of the three fundamental questions posed at the outset—namely, Is the invasion of national sovereignty which would be necessary for any worthwhile control system, however limited, a political possibility—either in the Soviet Union or in the United States? Is there any such thing as a plan on which both the Soviet Union and the United States could agree?

Is Disarmament Politically Acceptable?

"THE MORE ONE STUDIES INTENSIVELY THE PROBLEM of disarmament," said President Eisenhower, just before the 1955 "summit" meeting in Geneva, "the more he finds himself in a sort of squirrel cage. He is running around pretty rapidly, and at times he has a feeling that he is merely chasing himself."

Everyone who has tried to find his way through the long history of East-West negotiation on this subject must have smiled sympathetically when reading the President's words. It does indeed seem like a squirrel cage on occasion.

But this sense of futility is by no means new. Mankind's efforts in the field of weapon control have almost always been abortive. The pages of history are strewn with the wreckage of disarmament plans, arms limitation agreements, weapon prohibitions and prohibitions of war itself. In spite of them all—critics would even say because of some—wars have recurred with disheartening regularity.



Ike: "In a squirrel cage . . . . "

Occasional Successes —

Occasionally for a short period of time or over a limited geographical area there has been a measure of success. Way back in 600 B.C—2,500 years ago—the warring Chinese states of the Yangtze Valley entered into a disarmament league and were able to achieve 100 years of peace. In 1817, following the Anglo-American War of 1812, Richard Rush, Acting United States Secretary of State, and Sir Charles Bagot, British minister to Washington, signed a

pact (the Rush-Bagot Agreement) limiting each of the two countries' naval strength on the Great Lakes to three vessels of equal tonnage and armament. This agreement was observed well and helped promote pacification of the Canadian-American frontier—a frontier which has become the longest unfortified international boundary anywhere in the world.

But Many Failures

But the occasional successes in the field of disarmament are more than counterbalanced by failures. Politically it is one of the most difficult problems statesmen and diplomats have faced. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 did not halt the arms race which preceded World War I. Between wars an elaborate effort was made to keep Germany disarmed. This effort could hardly be called a disarmament "agreement," since it arose out of the Versailles treaty. But it was probably the first serious experiment in modern times with international arms control. The occupying powers undertook to impose and police a set of strict limitations on Germany's armed forces and armaments. The comparative ease with which these controls were evaded—even by a country defeated in war—is now a familiar story. No doubt the Allies could have checked the rebirth of the German army had they not looked the other way at critical moments; but their experience, at best, is not reassuring.

The Allies, too, had been committed to reduce their arms. This commitment was embodied in Part V of the Versailles treaty and in Article VIII of the League of Nations Covenant. A long series of conferences was held to carry out the promise. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 established a 5-5-3 ratio among the navies of the United States, Britain and Japan, but this restriction bound the Japanese Empire only a few years. Modifications and adjustments were sought at Geneva in 1927 and at London in 1930 and 1935, without notable success in any really crucial area. Indeed, many believe these agreements pro-

vided the shelter under which Japan was able to prepare for its aggression in Eastern Asia and the Pacific.

League of Nations Efforts

While these and other efforts were taking place outside the League of Nations, attempts were being made by the League to implement Article VIII, which had specified that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." A Preparatory Commission was set up in 1925 to explore the ground. It did a great deal of technical work, but fundamental disagreement between Britain and France blocked progress, as it had earlier in this interwar period. The disagreement was over that age-old problem of which came first, disarmament or security. Britain, together with the dominions, the Scandinavian countries and (outside the League) the United States, argued for a "direct" approach, that is, for disarmament first; France, backed by Belgium and the states of Eastern Europe, insisted on priority for national security, to be achieved by guarantees of collective action against an aggressor.

Era of Pacts

Efforts to meet the French point of view led to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Pact of 1925, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; but France never was satisfied with the degree of reassurance, and refused to disarm. A world disarmament conference in Geneva in 1932—the first ever held—broke down on essentially the same issue, with President Herbert Hoover proposing a one-third cut in armaments and the outlawing of "weapons of aggression," while France insisted on an international police force and control, by the League, of that type of weapons. (How defensive weapons could be distinguished from offensive ones is a mystery to this day.) Japanese and Italian aggression in

the 1930's, plus the rise of Hitler, ended all serious thought of disarmament.

Inspection and Control Neglected

One notable fact about all these efforts in the interwar period was that inspection and control, let alone enforcement, were hardly given serious consideration. They were minority proposals, regarded askance by the majority. The principal draft put before the 1932 disarmament conference, for example, contained provision for nothing more in the way of enforcement than a permanent committee to advise the League on execution of the proposed treaty. The assumption was that each nation would police itself. It was an assumption about as realistic, in retrospect, as the efforts to "outlaw" war which were being made in this era of idealism.

New Effort in Atomic Era

When the United Nations Charter was written, the French view—security first—was made official doctrine. Indeed, the Charter laid great emphasis on collective security and much less on disarmament. The founding fathers of the new UN intended that the Security Council should have at its disposal a world police force. Chapter VII of the Charter made provision for such a force and for its employment, if necessary, in case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." Unhappily, this police force never came into being; the Military Staff Committee—that is to say, the Big Five powers—working under the shadow of the Security Council veto, were never able to agree on its composition.

Once again, therefore, as they had between the wars, the great powers attempted disarmament before they had arranged for security. Once again, it was to prove a fruitless task. Only now, in the mid-1950's, as prospects for a European security system brighten, has disarmament begun to appear feasible.

Two Plans: U.S. and U.S.S.R.

In the atmosphere of the early postwar period, the effort had to be made. The mushroom clouds which rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the scores of thousands of dead who lay beneath them—impelled a search. A new age—the atomic age—had arrived. If this age was to bless man, not destroy him, some answer to its principal challenge had to be sought.

The American answer was the Baruch plan—international ownership and management of atomic materials and facilities. The idea of a world monopoly of atomic energy was imaginative and far-reaching. It made, or appeared to make, a great deal of practical sense. But in retrospect it does not appear to have been politically realistic.

Baruch Plan Unrealistic

If we thought the Russians would "buy" the plan, we sadly misread the signs of the times. It envisaged a sacrifice of national sovereignty and a degree of world government which were revolutionary even for the United States, let alone for a country like the Soviet Union, whose system of government was largely based on isolation from the outside world. Had the Kremlin accepted it, the U.S.S.R. would have had to give an International Authority, composed mainly of capitalist countries, control over an important part of its domestic economy, that part which would be keyed to nuclear power. The authority would have owned all uranium, operated all power reactors and supervised all nuclear research in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. could never legitimately have become an atomic power in the military field; and it would have had to accept on good faith the pledge of the United States that American nuclear weapons would all be destroyed eventually, as the treaty provided. To strip away the Iron Curtain and admit the outside world—the world the Kremlin believed hostile—might have been to lose control over the Soviet people, to disillusion them with communism, in short to commit political suicide.

None of these things the Kremlin was willing to do. It is at least possible to wonder whether, despite original good intentions, the United States itself would in fact have destroyed its bombs and turned over Oak Ridge and all our other multibillion-dollar atomic plants, with all their secrets, to an international agency, however friendly its governing majority might be. In order to

How to Let Go?

Justus in *The Minneapolis Star*

assure Congress that we were not putting our national security and our military posture into the hands of other countries, Mr. Acheson, in a covering letter transmitting the Acheson-Lilienthal report, included a statement that the United States—not the au-

thority—would decide when the control system had reached the point of "effective operation" and, therefore, when atomic bomb stockpiles would be destroyed and atomic secrets unveiled. We ultimately agreed to let the authority decide; but the Russians never tired of quoting Mr. Acheson for propaganda purposes, and he was kept busy explaining that he merely meant the Senate would have to ratify any treaty embracing the Baruch plan. The Russians professed to believe that the decision to destroy the stockpiles would be indefinitely postponed; and for all we know now—if we are honest with ourselves—it might have been. We obviously would have had considerable influence over the authority's decision; and when the moment actually came, we might indeed have had cold feet. Soviet actions might have forced us to reverse our original intentions. The Baruch plan made no provision for reducing the massive Soviet land army—and the atom bomb was the factor which kept that army from marching west.

No Realism in Soviet Plan

If the Baruch plan was not wholly realistic, politically, the counterproposal the Soviets offered was far less so. Five days after Mr. Baruch had presented his ideas—that is, on June 19, 1946—Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko came forward. His plan bore obvious marks of haste. It provided for "prohibition" by treaty of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons, destruction of bomb stockpiles within three months of the time the treaty went into effect, and punishment of violators by domestic legislation. Mr. Gromyko offered to join in study of "the measures, systems, and organization of control" and in "the elaboration of a system of sanctions." But there was no provision for international control in his plan. It could hardly have been put forward seriously.

Even as an asking price in a bargaining process, this plan was naïve. It made sense only as propaganda and as a delaying mechanism while Soviet scientists sought to catch up with the United States in the atomic weapon race. As diplomacy, it be-

longed back in the atmosphere of the early 1920's, the atmosphere which gave rise to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing war, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, outlawing poisonous gas and bacteriological warfare.

Moscow's Price Too High

The proposal that atomic weapons be prohibited by decree in 1946 was in effect a proposal that the United States give up its principal source of military power and, at a stroke, reduce itself to the level—or below the level—of the Soviet Union. This was obviously too high a price to pay for tenuous safety from atomic attack. The United States was ready to make that sacrifice only if it could be certain it was gaining safety from atomic attack.

The Soviet plan was too unrealistic even to be effective propaganda, although it had the simplicity which is one of propaganda's essential ingredients. Little by little, over the years, it was revised. In 1947 Mr. Gromyko offered a program of international control. He proposed to set up a 12-nation commission whose authority would extend to inspection but not to ownership or management. The inspection was to be fairly extensive but by no means as extensive as that provided for in the Baruch plan; and it was to be periodic, with special inspections on suspicion of violation. The system would embrace all atomic facilities listed as such by national governments. The commission also would be empowered to check, by processes of accounting, on the production and use of nuclear fuel; it could request information from governments on the activities of plants; it could "work out and prescribe the rules of technological control" and "observe" their "fulfillment"; it could "recommend" measures to the Security Council in case of violation. This "control" scheme—"control" always was synonymous with "inspection" to the Russians[1]—would

[1] In French and Russian, the word "control" is virtually synonymous with the English words "inspection" and "verification." One "controls" a bank statement at the end of the month, or a tab in a restaurant. The difference in language was a stumbling block to diplomats for some time.

Progress Of Mankind

come into effect after atomic bombs had been prohibited and destroyed.

This plan, although an improvement on the previous one, was still far from acceptable to the West. The Atomic Energy Commission, which had spent most of the summer, fall and winter of 1946 filling in the details of the Baruch plan—in fact, tightening it up—now spent most of the summer, fall and winter of 1947 exploring the Soviet alternative. The majority concluded in the spring of 1948 that the Gromyko plan did not "provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of atomic energy" and that since the Soviet Union would not modify it, the commission had "reached an impasse."

'Periodic' Inspection: Too Many Loopholes

The difficulty, in the eyes of the West, was that "periodic" inspection contained too many loopholes. Special inspections on suspicion of violation would not help, since "there would in practice be no opportunity for the international control commission to become suspicious." Using this method, it would not be possible for the commission to prevent diversion from peaceful uses, nor would it be possible to discover secret manufacture. And "even such a feeble scheme of control" would not be put into effect until after the United States had given up its atomic

Yardley in the *Baltimore Sun*

weapons. This the West called "completely unrealistic." Like the 1946 plan, they implied, it was a means of readjusting the military balance of power in the Soviet Union's favor.

The only hope of agreement—and it was a very minute hope indeed—was to mobilize public opinion on behalf of the West's ideas and thus impel a change in the Soviet stand. The Kremlin had shown itself sensitive to the pressures of public opinion in the past, notably in Iran in 1946. Perhaps something could be done again. If not, at least a valuable propaganda victory could be won. So the West took the Baruch plan into the 1948 General Assembly and sought overwhelming endorsement from that organ, sometimes called the spokesman for the conscience of the world.

An all-out propaganda battle resulted. Each side sought to fix blame on the other for the commission's failure. In the end, the West won; the Baruch plan, as revised in the AEC, was endorsed 40-6, with only the Communists voting "No." It was a major moral victory. But it did not impel any basic Soviet policy change.

The opportunity to bring the atom under control in its infancy had been lost. Nine months later the Soviet Union set off its first atomic explosion.

1949-1954: Agonizing Reappraisal

THE END OF THE AMERICAN MONOPOLY OF ATOMIC weapons changed the whole basis for disarmament thinking, and should have impelled fundamental changes in the policies of East and West. But these changes were agonizingly slow to develop.

Some policy-makers and diplomats stopped to take stock. What were the essential differences between the Soviet Union and the United States? They were twofold: (a) on the nature and degree of control; and (b) on the timing of the various steps in the disarmament process. The deadlock on the nature of control seemed wholly unbreakable; perhaps some compromise might be possible on timing.

The Soviet Union seemed to be willing to give a little in this area. During the debate in the 1948 General Assembly—apparently in an effort to make the Soviet Union's position less vulnerable, propaganda-wise—Andrei Vishinsky had made one apparent concession: that the two conventions, or treaties—one on prohibition, the other on control—could be "signed and brought into operation simultaneously."

Had this meant what it said, it would have met one of the West's principal objections. It would have meant that the United States would not have to destroy its bombs before control was ready to operate. But later questioning of Vishinsky developed that although the convention on control would be "brought into operation" on a given date, inspectors would not have been recruited and stationed by that time. He acknowledged that there would be a time lag between actual prohibition and actual control.

Vishinsky's Concessions

In the General Assembly of 1951-52, again under severe propaganda pressure from the West, Vishinsky came forward with a "new" concession. It was that "prohibition and control would be put into effect simultaneously." This time, he insisted, they really would. When pinned down on details, Jacob A. Malik, then chief Soviet delegate to the UN, explained the sequence of events in these terms: First there would be a "decision in principle" on prohibition and control; then the control organ would be set up; and finally, when the inspectors were "ready to undertake immediate practical control," the obligation not to use atomic weapons and to begin dismantling them would take effect. The West sought to find out just how "practical" a control system he envisaged, but Malik refused to elaborate until a "decision in principle" on prohibition had been taken. Since a "decision in principle" would not be very different in effect from a decision to prohibit, the West concluded that the Soviet Union had not really accepted simultaneity. Once again, there was a deadlock.

Argentine - Philippine Proposal

Various neutral countries tried to find some formula to bring East and West nearer together. In 1949 Argentina and the Philippines had proposed that as a first step, nations be permitted to keep their nuclear weapons but agree not to use them. Vishinsky included this idea in his annual peace package the following

year as the General Assembly opened, but it was buried so deeply in a basket of hypocritical propaganda sweepings that it received little notice. The Korean war was in full swing at this point, and talk of disarmament was hardly to be taken seriously.

Following the Korean armistice, the idea of "prohibition of the use" of nuclear weapons was revived. It was the Soviet Union's answer to the Eisenhower plan for peaceful use of nuclear energy, presented to the Assembly in a dramatic moment on December 8, 1953. There would have to be such a prohibition, the Kremlin said, before the Soviet Union could cooperate with an international agency to promote peaceful uses.

British - French Memorandum

In 1954 the West gingerly toyed with accepting this Argentine-Philippine compromise formula (seconded in 1951 by Egypt). A British-French memorandum, presented to a five-power Disarmament Subcommittee (the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Canada), offered to outlaw the use of A-bombs except in defense against aggression, or rather, to reaffirm Charter obligations having the same effect. A few months later the Soviet Union agreed to use the British-French memorandum as a "basis" of discussion, and on May 10, 1955 the Kremlin offered "prohibition of the use" except in cases of aggression determined as such by the Security Council.

This idea—that nuclear weapons could remain in stockpiles but would be subject to restraint—was the first breath of realism in the atomic control argument. Here, obviously, was a first step nations could take with some confidence; they could experiment with international control, meanwhile keeping their weapons safe, in reserve, in case it was necessary to fall back on them.

At long last, it seemed, the log jam on timing was beginning to break. But this was only a first step. The whole process of arms reduction and control would have to be timed—or "phased"—so that the balance of power would not be upset at any point.

The Soviet Union never had agreed to any realistic program of stages; from the very outset, in 1946, it had wanted to put prohibition first, at least "in principle," and control second, with an across-the-board percentage reduction of conventional armaments. In the latter field, that is, nonatomic weapons, there was also fundamental disagreement on timing of the necessary steps.

A Commission for Conventional Armaments had been established in February 1947. Because of a dispute between the West and the Soviet Union over whether it was to handle atomic armaments as well—the Soviets wanted it to, but were defeated—it did not get down to work until that fall. Then it became embroiled in the same academic dispute which had bedeviled the League of Nations—namely, whether the chicken of disarmament should precede the egg of "international confidence and security," or vice versa.

Finally, in 1949, under prodding by the Assembly, the commission plunged into its substantive work. The French outlined an elaborate plan for a census of armed forces and conventional armaments as the first step toward arms reduction. The Russians, crying "espionage," demanded reduction first, then verification, of a much less thorough kind. If there was to be a census, the Russians said, it must include the highly secret American stockpile of atomic bombs, which they knew full well the United States would not disclose under these conditions. Efforts foundered and collapsed in early 1950 when the Soviets walked out of all UN organs, including the Commission for Conventional Armaments, over the Chinese representation issue. The Korean war followed.

Disarmament Commission

In 1951 the United States, Britain and France proposed to the Assembly that discussion of atomic and conventional weapons be consolidated in a Disarmament Commission to replace both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The Soviet Union agreed. By way of terms

U.S. Air Bases Abroad

of reference, the West offered the new Disarmament Commission a plan based largely on the French census, plus a reaffirmation of the Baruch plan "unless and until a better or no less effective system can be devised."

As one concession to the Soviet Union in the area of timing, the West offered to include in the census, by graduated stages, "all armaments, including atomic." There would be "verification . . . based on effective international inspection to insure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed." After the original census and verification (the process would continue indefinitely), there would be reduction of "all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defense but not for aggression." At least, the reduction would take place if East and West could agree on what those levels were.

This plan looked good, at first glance. It won widespread approval and served what certainly was one of its purposes, namely to dramatize for world opinion the Soviet Union's responsibility for the continuing arms race. (Western Europe had begun to tire of the sacrifices necessary to build "situations of strength" and needed this reminder to strengthen its resolve.) Vishinsky helped the West to its propaganda victory by a colossal blunder; he said the plan "kept me awake most of the night laughing." Country after country, including the Arab-Asian neutralists, rebuked him for this cynicism, whereupon he had to march back up to the podium and all but apologize.

Western Plan Raised Questions

As an exercise in statecraft (as distinct from propaganda), however, the Western plan now appears to have been somewhat less than realistic. What it proposed was that an international team of inspectors go into every country possessing "substantial" military resources and try to count armed forces and armaments of every kind—that is, if taken literally, every rifle, every round of ammunition, every grenade, every soldier, every policeman,

every MVD and FBI man ("paramilitary, security and police forces")—virtually everything right down to the cans of Spam in quartermaster warehouses. This would have been difficult enough as a practical matter; but politically it was even less probable. It flew straight in the face of the Russian mania for secrecy without offering the Kremlin much incentive to change that policy.

We proposed to try to agree with the Russians on how many carbines, revolvers, pistols, rifles, mortars, artillery and tanks each could have, matching—and balancing one against the other—disparate items of equipment with incommensurate firepower.

We proposed to establish criteria for permissible armed forces and armaments—so many per square mile of territory, per mile of vulnerable border, per person of population, per unit of gross national product. (When is a border vulnerable? How great is the threat from across it? What about alliances?) We proposed to draw a nice line of distinction between military establishments "adequate for defense" but not adequate "for aggression," which was one step away from deciding (as President Hoover proposed in 1932) whether an artillery piece was a "weapon of aggression" or not. (This formulation was later dropped as totally impracticable.)

Eisenhower Plan

The Disarmament Commission got nowhere with the Soviet Union in 1952 and hardly met in 1953. Soviet policy had gone into a deep freeze; Soviet delegates monotonously demanded "prohibition of atomic weapons" and a "one-third reduction" of conventional armaments, sometimes varying the theme with charges of "germ warfare" in Korea and demands for its prohibition. The West simplified its ideas in the nonatomic field, suggesting numerical ceilings on men under arms and corresponding reductions in conventional armament; but the Soviet Union refused to bite. It was not until the Eisenhower "atoms-for-peace" plan in December 1953, the British-French memorandum

of June 1954, and the Soviet responses of September 1954 and May 1955 that the log jam began to break up.

History may record that the Eisenhower plan was a turning point in atomic diplomacy, changing both the atmosphere and the terms of reference for East-West negotiations. If it did nothing else, it put the Russians in an impossible propaganda position where they could neither accept nor reject without giving the United States an overwhelming victory. The only answer was to divert attention; and that called for no mean effort. The death of Stalin in March 1953; the fact that the United States did not hit the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack in the confusion which followed (as the Kremlin is said to have expected); the explosion of a hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union in August 1953; the multiplication of intense economic pressures within the Soviet Union, largely as a result of the cost of arms—all these factors, too, must have played a part in the great "thaw" of 1955.

The 'Thaw': Log Jam Breaks

THE FIRST HINT OF THE THAW CAME in September 1954, when Vishinsky announced he would use "as a basis" for discussion the British-French memorandum of June 1954. This memorandum was an outgrowth of ideas put forward in 1952 and 1953 by French delegate Jules Moch, who had striven tirelessly to break the deadlock on timing. The memo had done much more than accept, with reservations, a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It had proposed a compromise time schedule, or set of stages, for the whole process of disarmament, both conventional and nuclear.

Up to the point at which the British-French memorandum was introduced, the Soviet Union—speaking very roughly—had wanted atomic prohibition first, then reduction of conventional arms, and finally, control (inspection). The West—equally roughly—had wanted the precise opposite, namely, inspection first, then reduction, and ultimately controlled prohibition.

The British-French memorandum proposed to start with what amounted to a prohibition "in principle" of the use of nuclear weapons. It then proposed to dovetail, or mesh, the remaining steps in a carefully integrated process.

There would be three stages. The first would freeze military manpower and budgetary expenditures, both for atomic and nonatomic weapons. The second would cut conventional arms 50 percent of the amount necessary to reach an agreed point (1 million to 1.5 million men in the case of the Soviet Union, the United States and China); and when these cuts had been made, the manufacture of nuclear weapons would cease. The third stage would see the second half of the agreed cuts in conventional arms and armed forces, and when that had been completed, the destruction of stockpiles and the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. At each stage a control organ would be in position, "able effectively to enforce" the steps before they began.

Soviet May 10 Proposals

Vishinsky in 1954 and Malik in 1955 accepted much of this new time schedule. They backed and filled, playing a now-you-see-it-now-you-don't game, withdrawing the concessions in March 1955, only to make them again in May. They wrung maximum propaganda capital from their concessions. But if the May 10, 1955 position outlined by Malik to the five-power Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission represents a policy the Soviet Union will stand by—and apparently it does, for it was repeated in similar form by Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin at the Geneva "summit" conference—the Kremlin now agrees:

1. That conventional armed forces should be reduced to the levels the West has "tentatively suggested," that is, 1 million to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 each for Britain and France (abandoning the idea of a one-third reduction, which had been Soviet policy since 1948);

2. That this reduction should take place in "two" (actually three) stages: (a) a freeze on armed forces, conventional armaments, and budgetary appropriations (conventional and atomic); (b) beginning simultaneously with the freeze, a cut in conven-

Armed Forces in Europe*



* Based on New York Times estimate (May 8, 1955)

tional armaments and armed forces by 50 percent of the amount necessary to reach agreed levels, and when complete, a prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (c) a cut in conventional arms and armed forces by the remaining 50 percent, with total prohibition and the destruction of stockpiles to begin half way through this process, that is, after 75 percent of the conventional reductions (the British and French had offered the 75 percent idea as a compromise on April 19, 1955);

3. That all countries having "substantial" military resources (notably including Communist China) must be included in the restrictions; and

4. That the basis for deciding how many conventional armaments are permissible is to be a set of "criteria," including "demographic, geographic, economic and political factors." The amount of arms would be adjusted to the number of men bearing them.

Points of Difference

The only important difference between East and West which remains in the area of timing is this: The Soviet Union does not make clear that a control organ will be in position, ready to verify the various reductions and prohibitions, when the steps are scheduled to begin. Interestingly enough, in the condensed version of the May 10 proposal which Marshal Bulganin presented to the "summit" conference in July, there was no reference to this point, the timing of control. Diplomats drew the inference that it is now open for negotiation.

There are lesser differences. One is the ceiling of 150,000 to 200,000 men which the Soviets would place on all armed forces other than those of the Big Five. This would not be as much as the West has planned for Germany. Another is provision for a world disarmament conference after the process has begun, whereas, in Western opinion, it would be vital to bring Communist China and others under the system before reductions got under way. Marshal Bulganin came part of the way toward meeting this point. Still another possible stumbling block is the Soviet demand that the West abandon its ring of air bases around the Soviet empire. As American delegate James J. Wadsworth has said, there would be no point in having bases without anything to put on them; but the West almost certainly will not want to begin dismantling its bases as early as the Soviet Union asked on May 10. There is also in the Soviet plan a provision for abandonment of nuclear weapon tests "as one of the first measures." This idea of a halt in tests in advance of an agreement on a program of arms control, and before the inspection system is in operation, has never been acceptable to the West.

Progress on Timing

In general, however, much progress has been made with respect to timing. The Soviet Union now appears to accept the basic Western idea that disarmament must be a carefully balanced process, so phased and timed that no country's national security would be in peril at any stage so long as the obligations are faithfully carried out.

But would they be faithfully carried out? What kind of safeguards are to be established? On this point—the extent and nature of control—there is still a wide East-West gulf.

This point, of course, always has been a major stumbling block. There was a yawning gulf between the Baruch plan and the Gromyko plans of 1946 and 1947. The United States wanted international ownership and management of nuclear facilities, plus veto-free enforcement; the Soviet Union wished to depend wholly on inspection, and would not even make the inspection continuous and uninhibited.

Two Sides Inching Forward

Little by little, however, the two sides have been inching toward each other. The United States has been moving toward acceptance of inspection as a method of control, and the Soviet Union has been slowly closing some of the loopholes it previously left in its inspection system.

The United States made the first moves. As early as 1950 President Truman outlined the "basic principles" on which any successful plan of disarmament must rest, without any mention of ownership and management. His emphasis was on safeguards "adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened violation." The following year the Western Big Three endorsed the Baruch plan only "unless and until a better or no less effective system can be devised."

Reference to the Baruch plan was quietly dropped after the change in administrations in Washington in 1952. A control



Nike – antiaircraft guided missile

paper submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee in May 1954 made no mention of ownership or management, listing the duties of the control authority as supervision and control of "progressive and continuous disclosures and verification." All the emphasis was on inspection, though it was added that the authority could have any other powers the disarmament treaty assigned it.

In the event the authority discovered a violation, it could report to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to individual states; while waiting for "appropriate action," it could cut off supplies of nuclear materials to the offending state, it could close nuclear plants in that state, and it could issue cease-and-

desist orders. A year later, in April 1955, an American-British-French-Canadian outline of the "principles of control" took another step in the direction of the Soviet position. Confirming the abandonment of ownership and management, it went further and dropped all specific detail on interim enforcement measures, saying such measures "as may be necessary" could be taken but leaving them to be negotiated. At the "summit," President Eisenhower talked of "inspection and reporting," without a word about "enforcement" or Baruch-type "control."

Toward Realism

These modifications of the American stand are in the direction of realism. The idea of "enforcement" dies hard in the United States; indeed, outside of official circles, it is still a very robust patient. But how could a control organ, in fact, cut off nuclear supplies to a country, such as the Soviet Union, which had its own mines? How would it go about "enforcing" a plant closure or a cease-and-desist order? If it were defied, what could it do, short of calling for collective military action by the General Assembly or by a regional security organization such as NATO? Enforcement is war when a great power is the violator; and a declaration of war is always available to the potential victims, whether or not "enforcement" is written into a treaty. This is why Washington has concluded that what is really needed, in fact as distinct from theory, is an early warning system. This is all any control plan short of world government could actually provide in any event.

An early warning system could be based on inspection alone. But it would have to be very extensive inspection, considerably more extensive than Gromyko was proposing in 1947. In the 1951-52 Assembly Vishinsky offered to tighten up the 1947 plan in one respect: inspection could be "continuous," as the West had demanded, rather than "periodic." It could not, however, "interfere in the internal affairs of states"; and how could any effective

inspection fail to "interfere" to some extent? Moreover, on questioning, it developed that although inspection could be "continuous," it could not be "permanent"; inspectors could not be stationed at a plant, could not "come in and put their feet on the table." The West wanted permament inspection at least at some plants.

The latest Soviet control plans, those of September 1954 and May 1955, appear to close this gap at long last. The precise language of the May 1955 plan, as translated by Tass, is this:

"[In the latter stages of the disarmament program] the international control agency will have the following rights and powers:

"A. To exercise control, including inspection on a permanent basis, on the scale necessary to insure the implementation of the . . . convention. . . .

"B. To have permanently in all countries signatories to the convention its staff of inspectors who, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, would have unhindered access at any time to all objects of control. . . .

"C. The control agency shall have unhindered access to materials pertaining to national budget appropriations for military needs. . . ."

How Much Control — And How?

Words do not always mean what they appear to say. What, for example, is the scale "necessary" to "insure implementation"? How much do the Russians consider "necessary"? What are the "control functions they [the inspectors] exercise?" Do they include aerial reconnaissance, for example? Always, in the past, the answer has been "No," and the Soviet Union's first public comments on the Eisenhower scheme—though not conclusive—have hardly been encouraging. Would the inspectors be stationed permanently in key plants, or would they merely reside permanently in the country involved? What are the "objects of control" referred to? Are these "objects of control" limited to

the nuclear plants the Soviet Union is willing to acknowledge it possesses? Vishinsky was queried on this point in late 1954. He replied with the question, "Do you want to inspect button factories?" The West assured him it did; how else could it be sure a so-called "button factory" was not producing bomb casings? As of April 1955, "objects of control" still did not include button factories or even tractor factories, which obviously could convert to tanks on short notice.

Perhaps most disturbing of all, the inspection system the Soviet Union outlines would apply only in the final stage of the disarmament program. In the earlier portion, when the first half of the conventional arms reductions is to take place, the powers of the control organ would be very much more limited. It could, in fact, do no more than examine defense budgets and "demand from the states the necessary information on the implementation of the measures." In this period the Soviet Union proposes to rely primarily on "control posts" which would watch for major mobilization of air, ground or naval forces.

Such a proposal must be a stand taken for bargaining purposes; the Kremlin could not seriously think the United States would "buy" it. At least, not in this form; we obviously would want many of our ideas combined with it. We said as much to the Disarmament Subcommittee in August 1955.

A Burst of Candor

For the Soviets to strip away the Iron Curtain and really accept comprehensive inspection would be a revolutionary step. In a burst of candor May 10, they admitted the fact—and said they doubted if we would open our doors to them. Their argument has been somewhat outdated by events, but it is interesting: "In the existing situation of distrust between states, all kinds of obstacles are raised even to the mutual exchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations. Such a situation makes difficult the conclusion of agreements regarding

the admission by states to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in war production, of foreign controllers who would inspect the enterprises.

"In the existing situation, when many states display legitimate concern for their security, it is difficult to expect that these states would trustfully give other states access to their industrial and other resources which are of vital importance for their security."

Are Russians Right?

President Eisenhower, in effect, acknowledged that the Russians may have something there. "What kind of inspection are we ready to accept?" he asked at his July 6, 1955 press conference. "Are we ready to open up every one of our factories, every place where something might be going on that could be inimical to the interests of somebody else? When you tackle that problem, you really get into the heart of the difficulties involved. . . ."

At the time, he did not suggest any answer. Suppose an international inspection team, including Soviet intelligence agents, were to land in New York and ask to be taken to Oak Ridge, to our guided missile factories, to the map and records room of the Strategic Air Command Headquarters—anywhere it wanted to go in our defense establishment or outside it. Would the knowledge that we could do the same inside the Soviet Union be sufficient incentive to us to acquiesce?

Difficult Decision for U.S.

We have never before had to answer this question on any but a theoretical basis; we have been able to propose uninhibited inspection, safe in the assurance that the Soviet Union would not agree. This is still the only logical presumption. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that some day they did agree. Asked what we would do in 1947 if the Russians accepted the Baruch plan, a governmental cynic replied, "Oh, we could always beat it in the Senate." What of 1955? Would we be willing to "live with"

our own 1946-54 inspection plans if the Soviet Union accepted them? We certainly would have a difficult decision to make, perhaps the most difficult we as a nation have ever made.

Many commentators frankly think we would refuse. Walter Lippmann describes acceptance as "the utopia where all Soviet babies will be born with angel's wings, and singing 'God Bless America.' " Joseph C. Harsch of *The Christian Science Monitor* feels it is "nonsense" to "imagine for one moment that the Congress of the United States would ratify an agreement under which the inspectors of an international authority would literally be free to roam at will through the military establishment of the United States."

Response in Congress and elsewhere in the country was generally favorable to the President's aerial-reconnaissance scheme, but this approval may have come, in part, from (a) a feeling that the Russians were not going to accept, and this being the case, the United States had much to gain before world opinion with little to lose; and (b) the knowledge that if by any chance the Russians were to accept, we would gain much more intelligence data not now in our possession than the Soviet Union. Even so, certain right-wing newspapers denounced the plan. Many American laws would have to be amended or repealed to make this operation legal.

Geneva 'Atoms-for-Peace' Conference

The "atoms-for-peace" conference in Geneva did much to transform the East-West climate; so, too, did such things as the visit of Soviet farm officials to the American Midwest. If this sort of thing continues, prospects for a certain amount of mutual inspection—both on the ground and in the air—obviously will brighten. But it will probably never be possible, so long as the Soviet Union is a Communist dictatorship, to obtain agreement on the type of inspection we proposed from 1946 to early 1955. The fact is, we ourselves are now prepared to accept—indeed in all candor,

the Administration would prefer—a somewhat less comprehensive and uninhibited type. We still want enough inspection to make an early warning system as nearly foolproof as possible, and that is a very great deal; but we do not insist on inspectors being able to go anywhere and everywhere at any time.

This new approach is certainly a change in the direction of realism and practicality. But it carries with it a sobering corollary. Since it is now clear that a 100 percent safe control plan is impossible both technically and politically, it follows that neither East nor West will be able to give up all its nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Stockpiles may perhaps be reduced by agreement, but they will not be wholly destroyed. Neither side can afford to acknowledge that it has reached this conclusion, because it is an impossible propaganda position; but it is a fact of life in the atomic age. Until the participants call a complete halt to one of the most intense ideological struggles the world has known since the Crusades, or until there is some revolutionary technological breakthrough, the total elimination of nuclear weapons will remain as a goal for the future—as a Holy Grail to be pursued and won when man has conquered fear, hatred, envy and greed, but not before.

The Future of Atomic Weapons

HOPE OF PARTIAL DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR CONTROL must rest, it would appear, on a fundamental change in the world atmosphere, on the development of that "mutual trust" which President Eisenhower said is the essential ingredient of peace. In the mid-20th century the advocates of security before disarmament surely are finding vindication for their views.

Disarmament and European Security

It is not impossible, however, that the world is witnessing first steps in the direction of fundamental change. Disarmament has now been linked to European security. An effort is being made to build a pilot plant, an experimental system of arms limitation and control in the European area which, when combined with security guarantees and political settlements, appears to have some chance of working.

British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden put forward such a plan at Geneva. He proposed a "system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe." Joint inspec-

tion teams, he suggested, would keep watch on "specified areas of agreed extent on either side" of the Iron Curtain. This program would provide a "practical test on a limited scale" of the idea of international inspection, and would furnish "valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future." One such "wider field" might be Europe as a whole; and Sir Anthony also suggested a pilot project for this area. He proposed efforts to reach agreement on the total of forces and armaments "of each side in Germany and the countries neighboring Germany." To "supervise" the agreement there would be "a system of reciprocal control," similar to that now in force within the countries which are members of the Western European Union. In effect, the arms limitations and control mechanisms of WEU would be extended eastward to include at least the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.

Such a plan appeals to many experienced diplomats as a genuinely practical and realistic approach. If successful, it could lead, as Sir Anthony suggested, to wider and still wider applications. Public opinion could gradually become accustomed to the idea of "foreign" inspectors; there would be a "relaxation of tension" of the kind which both President Eisenhower and the Kremlin have said is essential for disarmament. World-wide arms limitation and nuclear energy control might for the first time begin to become politically feasible.

Effect in Other Fields

If such a day ever were to arrive, it would hold great promise, not merely in the obvious field—removal of atomic fears—but in the political and economic fields as well. There is much to be gained for the United States in a program of disarmament which would remove the Iron Curtain. At the very least, it would reduce the fears, misunderstanding and suspicion which arise from ignorance—ignorance on both sides. At best, it is not inconceivable that the end of the Iron Curtain could be the be-

ginning of the end of international communism as we have known it in our time.

Contact with the outside world—with the ideas and ways of free men—could set a ferment to working inside the Soviet Union which would either produce an "erosion from despotism," in George F. Kennan's phrase, or the explosive overthrow of tyranny. It was not for nothing that Stalin isolated his people from all contact with the outside world. Had the Soviet people known what they were denied and how they had been deceived, they might never have put up with bondage. Even a totalitarian system requires a certain minimum of consent, or at least submission.

Caution Always Necessary

On the other hand, the United States dare not be tempted to reduce its armed might too quickly or with too little assurance of safety, regardless of the possible benefits to be derived. The Communists are fully capable of laying a trap for the naïve and well-intentioned in the West. The Soviet historian E. V. Tarle, in his *History of Diplomacy,* says:

"The masking of purely aggressive and predatory aims for the sake of which wars are undertaken is constantly encountered in history. . . . Examples of the concealment of predatory ends behind noble principles are offered by the exploitation of the idea of disarmament and pacifist propaganda in the broad sense of the word for one's own purposes.

"From time immemorial, the idea of disarmament has been one of the most favored forms of diplomatic dissimulation of the true motives and plans of those governments which have been seized by a sudden 'love of peace.' This phenomenon is very understandable. Any proposal for the reduction of armaments could invariably count upon broad popularity and support from public opinion."

How much of the current disarmament effort is sincere, and how much is "diplomatic dissimulation"? It is impossible to say.

But one thing is clear. It is in the national interest of all countries to avoid nuclear war, whether they all realize it or not.

No responsible head of government in his right mind would deliberately touch off an H-bomb holocaust so long as the possibility of retaliation exists. The danger is that some fanatic might try to knock out the capacity for retaliation with a massive assault; or that a frightened leader, believing himself in peril of attack, would order a "counterattack" when it was not really necessary. Perhaps for the future there is also a third danger: that some irresponsible petty despot will give way to frustration and, thinking he himself has little to lose, will obtain and use the bomb.

Universal Inspection?

This kind of danger can be lessened. The United States would like to see all countries open their doors to aerial and ground inspection, so that the early warning system designed originally for the two great giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, would become universal. We plan to call upon the United Nations General Assembly to help bring about such a world.

Given widespread aerial reconnaissance, supplemented by ground observation, the preparations for a massive, knockout attempt probably could be detected in time. If the assumption is true that this kind of attack is the only kind likely to be launched with premeditation by a rational individual—and it does seem to be a sound assumption—then an early warning system probably could prevent deliberate nuclear war. It certainly could reduce the danger of miscalculation and panic. And the likelihood that some small country which does not now have nuclear facilities would be able to make the bomb in the future would be minimized, since inspectors could be on the spot from the first day such a country obtained a reactor.

The world may be slow to accept this less than perfect answer to the challenge of the nuclear age. Some diplomats no doubt will go on talking about total elimination of all weapons of mass

destruction. But until X-ray cameras can penetrate the depths of the earth and search out hidden stores of bombs and bomb material, until nations are ready to accept strict controls over all means of bomb delivery—civilian and military aircraft, rocket-launching submarines, missiles, even travelers' luggage—until similar means are found to control biological and other weapons of mass destruction, some of them even more destructive than the H-bomb, there can be no guarantee of 100 percent safety.

Lacking such a guarantee, it is extremely unlikely that either side in the current ideological struggle will actually scrap its nuclear weapons, whatever its diplomats may propose. But little by little, their numbers may be cut and the danger of their use may be reduced.

British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan returned from the Geneva "summit" meeting convinced that "there ain't going to be any war." Aside from the violence he did to English syntax—the proper expression, of course, is "there ain't going to be no war"—he may well have summed up a fundamental necessity of our times. "There is," said President Eisenhower, "no longer any alternative to peace."

Talking It Over

IN THIS DISCUSSION GUIDE YOU WILL FIND discussion topics, reading references, and suggestions for visual aids[1] arranged for eight weekly meetings. These can be contracted or expanded according to the time at your disposal and the special interest of those who are participating in the discussion.

If you need any help or guidance to set up a discussion group or organize the special project suggested at the end of this discussion outline, write to Dorothy B. Robins, Consultant on Special Programs, Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all films are 16mm, sound, and in black and white.

Discussion Questions

1. Why Has Disarmament Failed in Past?

Throughout the ages thoughtful men have dreamed of a world where it might prove possible to beat swords into plowshares, to substitute peaceful construction for the recurring destructiveness of wars.

Why have these dreams remained unrealized? Why, in particular, did the disarmament discussions after World War I come to naught and, worse, end in the outbreak of a global conflict? Was this due to the wickedness or stupidity of human beings, or is the disarmament problem incapable of solution?

READING REFERENCES

Moch, Jules, *Human Folly: To Disarm or Perish*. London, Gollancz, 1955.
Shotwell, J. T., and Salvin, M., *Lessons on Security and Disarmament—From the History of the League of Nations*. New York, King's Crown, 1949.

2. How Has Atom Affected Disarmament?

Since earliest time, war has been cruel, no matter how many efforts were made to humanize it. Human beings have been killed or crippled by all kinds of weapons, from those of the Stone Age to those of the nuclear age.

Why do some military and political experts believe that atomic weapons have improved the outlook for disarmament? What do they mean when they say that the prospect of nuclear destruction "has made war obsolete"? Do you think nuclear weapons prevent or help prevent war? If so, in your judgment is this a convincing argument against nuclear disarmament?

READING REFERENCES

Bradley, David J., *No Place to Hide*. Boston, Little, 1948.
Churchill, Sir Winston, *Text No. 6*. New York, British Information Services, March 2, 1955. Speech in Defense Debate in House of Commons, March 1, 1955.
Dean, Gordon, *Report on the Atom*. New York, Knopf, 1953. Particularly Chapters VI and VII.
Woodward, E. L., *Some Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.

VISUAL AIDS

A Is for Atom. General Electric (all offices); 1953; 15 min.; color; free loan. An animated film explaining in lay terms what an atom is, how energy is released from certain kinds of atoms, and the peacetime uses of atomic energy and the by-products of nuclear fission.

One World—Or None. Association Films, 347 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.; 1946; 9 min.; rental, $4.00. Produced in cooperation with the National Committee on Atomic Information. Five concepts are developed: There is no secret—atomic energy was discovered through the combined efforts of scientists of many nations; the destruction at Hiroshima is compared with that which would result in major cities of the world; the deadly effectiveness of the atom bomb is compared with that of other weapons in the past; the vulnerability of any nation is emphasized; and that there is no effective defense is proven graphically. Therefore, the people of the world must learn to live together.

3. What Is Great-Power Arms Balance Today?

In the atmosphere of intense ideological rivalry which followed the disintegration of the wartime alliance, East and West plunged into one of history's greatest arms races. It began, for the West, with the Czechoslovak coup of 1948 and reached its height during the Korean war in 1950.

What nations compose the two coalitions of West and East? What are their relative strengths in land forces? in air power? in naval weapons? What is Germany's role in the arms picture? Would it be possible to achieve stability by striking a balance of armed power between the two coalitions? Or would such an attempt eventually lead to war?

READING REFERENCES

Baldwin, Hanson, "Problem for Geneva: A Balance of Power." *The New York Times,* Section IV, July 3, 1955.

"Is United States Losing Arms Race to Russia?" *U.S. News and World Report,* June 3, 1955.

VISUAL AIDS

Evaluating a Nation. United States Army Film Libraries (address the one in your locality); 1951; 19 min.; free rental. Concepts for evaluating the strength of a nation in terms of national and global power; relationship of those concepts to the Communist scheme of world conquest and the need for sending American troops to Europe.

World Balance of Power. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, 202 East 44th St., New York, N.Y.; 1952; 20 min.; rental, $4.50. Discusses the principle of world balance of power as the foundation of national independence and international peace in the modern world. Suggests that in the present international crisis new aggressions and wars can be prevented by the adherence of nations to the balance-of-power principle.

4. What Has the UN Done About Collective Security?

One guiding hope of our times has been that the problem of disarmament could be gradually resolved through the creation of a workable system of collective security which would make it unnecessary for individual nations to maintain large military forces. This hope was reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919; it was reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter of 1945.

What steps has the United Nations taken toward establishment of a world police force? What was the role of the UN Military Staff Committee? Why did its efforts in 1946-48 fail? How far did the General Assembly go in 1950 toward establishing a veto-free police force? Why was this effort not wholly successful? Do you think the United States should contribute troops to a world police force without strings attached?

READING REFERENCES

Goodrich, Leland M., and Simons, Anne P., *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. Washington, Brookings, 1955.

Frye, William R., *The US Stake in the UN: Problems of United Nations Charter Review*. New York, Columbia University, American Assembly, 1954. Chapter 3.

Sections on Military Staff Committee and on "Strengthening the Peace" in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, published by the Department of Public Information of the United Nations, New York, 1946-47, 1947-48, 1950, and 1951.

VISUAL AIDS

Boundary Lines. International Film Foundation, 345 East 46th St., New York, N.Y.; 1947; color; rental, $7.50. A plea to eliminate the arbitrary "boundary lines" which divide people from each other as individuals and as nations, invisible boundary lines of color, origin, wealth and religion. Points out that these lines result in an accumulation of fear and suspicion and finally in war.

5. What Has the UN Done About Disarmament?

As in past generations, the UN tried to proceed with disarmament despite the fact that efforts to build collective security on a world scale had failed. First it tried to deal with atomic weapons separately from conventional, or old-fashioned, arms; then, in 1952, it began dealing with both types together.

What efforts were made in the UN Atomic Energy Commission?

in the Commission for Conventional Armaments? in the Disarmament Commission, which combined the two? What were the basic reasons why neither side in the cold war was willing to disarm on the terms outlined by the other? To what extent, in your judgment, were disarmament efforts sincere, and to what extent were they propaganda maneuvers?

READING REFERENCES

Goodrich and Simons, cited.
Frye, cited.
Sections on disarmament in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1946-7, 1947-8, 1948-9, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953.
The Record on Disarmament, Department of State, Sept. 13, 1954 (Dept. of State Publication 5581).
UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee Documents, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, pp. 892-905.

6. Can East-West Security Aims Be Reconciled?

Hitherto the positions of the West and East on disarmament have been poles apart. Since Stalin's death, however, the "collective leadership" of the U.S.S.R. has seemed to come gradually closer to the Western concept—and it has also seemed that the West may be changing some of its views on disarmament safeguards.

To what extent has the Soviet Union moved toward the Western position since 1946? Why? To what extent has the West moved toward the Soviet position? Why? What are the views on disarmament today of Britain? France? the United States? the U.S.S.R.? What are the principal areas of agreement between East and West? the principal areas of disagreement?

READING REFERENCES

BRITAIN: Attlee, Clement, *Text No. 9* (New York, British Information Services, March 14, 1955), speech on "Hydrogen Bomb" in House of Commons, March 11, 1955. Eden, Sir Anthony, *Text No. 11* (New York, British Information Services, March 15, 1955), speech on "The Disarmament Question" in House of Commons, March 14, 1955.
FRANCE: Statement by Premier Edgar Faure, July 13, 1955, *The New York Times*, July 14, 1955. Address of Premier Pierre Mendès-France to UN General Assembly, November 22, 1954, the New York *Herald Tribune*, November 23, 1954.
U.S.S.R.: Note of the Soviet Government, May 10, 1955, "Text of Peace Proposal

Offered by Soviet Union to the United Nations," *The New York Times,* May 11, 1955.

UNITED STATES: Speech by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on "Atoms-for-Peace" to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953, *The New York Times,* December 9, 1953. Speech by President Eisenhower to meeting of Big Four Chiefs of State, Geneva, July 21, 1955, *The New York Times,* July 22, 1955.

Cavers, David F., "The Arms Stalemate Ends." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* January 1955; also other articles in that issue.

7. What Safeguards Are Needed During Disarmament?

Many people in the West feel that the security of the Western nations would be imperiled by a disarmament agreement unless strict provisions are made for its "enforcement." Others feel that international inspection would be enough. Still others contend that inspection of nuclear production is impractical, or even undesirable inside the Western defense establishment.

What conclusions have you reached after studying the subject?

READING REFERENCES

A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Acheson-Lilienthal Report). Washington, D.C., Department of State, March 16, 1946.

Dean, Gordon, *Report on the Atom,* cited.

Finletter, Thomas K., and Heckscher, August, "Should United States Risk Unenforced Disarmament?" *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* Vol. XXXIV, No. 23, August 15, 1955.

Text of President Eisenhower's Press Conference, July 6, 1955, *The New York Times,* July 7, 1955.

8. What Would We Do With Savings on Arms?

Aside from the hope that disarmament would end the fear of war, many nations—particularly those in underdeveloped areas—look forward to the time when savings on armaments may be applied to their development on a large scale, as suggested by President Eisenhower and Premier Faure.

How could this transfer from wartime to peacetime expenditures be effected? What would it mean for the future of both industrialized and as yet nonindustrialized nations? How would it affect prospects for democracy? for communism?

READING REFERENCES

Address by Eisenhower to UN General Assembly, December 8, 1953, cited.

Statements by Premier Faure, July 13, 1955, cited, and July 18, 1955, *New York Times,* July 19, 1955.

VISUAL AIDS

A Time for Greatness. Association Films, 347 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.; 1952; 27 min.; rental, $3.00. Sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee. Based on the pamphlet, *Steps to Peace—A Quaker View of U.S. Foreign Policy.* Expresses moral concern over the use of military force as the chief instrument of foreign policy. Surveys what the Quakers have learned about securing peace and understanding between peoples of other nations as a result of the many years of experience derived from the work of the American Friends Service Committee.

Workshop on 'Security in the Atomic Age'

Understanding of the many issues of "Security in the Atomic Age" calls for study and serious discussion. A one-day workshop, sponsored by an organization or group of organizations or a university, offers a good opportunity to stimulate thinking about these questions.

Pre-workshop reading and study should be urged. For instance this HEADLINE SERIES by William R. Frye and the "Talking It Over" questions and reading references on the preceding pages will make useful advance study material.

Following is a suggested program for the workshop:

9:30 a.m. Registration.

10:00 Plenary Meeting — Welcome by workshop chairman, who outlines schedule and aims of the workshop meeting.

10:15 Keynote speech on "Security in the Atomic Age." Information about possible speakers may be obtained from the Speakers Bureau, Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York, or from a world affairs council or community Foreign Policy Association.

As an alternative to a speech, the program committee for the workshop may decide to show one or two films, such as *One World—Or None* (Association Films; 1946; 9 minutes; rental, $4.00) and *A Is for Atom* (General Electric; 1953; 15 minutes; color; free rental).

11:00-12:30 Round-table Discussion. The workshop members will meet in simultaneous groups of ten to fifteen people to discuss a series of questions carefully prepared and if possible circulated in advance. These questions may cover: international control of atomic energy, atoms for peace, conventional armaments control, feasibility of general disarmament in the world of today, security needs of the United States.

12:45-1:30 Informal Box Lunch.

1:45-3:00 Round Tables (continue).

3:15-4:00 Plenary Meeting—Report of Round Tables. Conclusion of workshop.

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The *Headline Series* and its companion publication, the semi-monthly *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* present the facts, clearly and concisely, on pressing problems of national concern. Discussion questions, reading and film suggestions and program ideas are included in each issue of the *Headline Series.*

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Future issues

The Many Uses of the Atom

by Waldemar Kaempffert

U.S. Aid to Underdeveloped Areas

by Forrest D. Murden, Jr.